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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the consequences of the fairness recommen-
dation of the Venice Commission in allocating voting districts among
larger administrative regions. This recommendation requires the size
of any constituency not to diﬀer from the average constituency size by
more than a ﬁxed limit. We show that this minimum diﬀerence con-
straint, while attractive per deﬁnition, is not compatible with mono-
tonicity and Hare-quota properties, two standard requirements of ap-
portionment rules.
We present an algorithm that eﬃciently ﬁnds an allotment such
that the diﬀerences from the average district size are lexicographically
minimized. This apportionment rule is a well-deﬁned allocation mech-
anism compatible with and derived from the recommendation of the
∗The authors thank Friedrich Pukelsheim, participants of the Mathematics of Electoral
Systems at Corvinus University and the support of the `Momentum' Programme (LP-
004/2010).
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Venice Commission. Finally, we compare this apportionment rule with
mainstream mechanisms using real data from Hungary and the United
States.
Keywords and phrases: Apportionment, voting, elections, Venice
Commission, proportionality, lexicographic ordering.
JEL codes: C71, D72
1 Introduction
One man  one vote! A properly functioning electoral system is the foun-
dation of any parliamentary democracy. The stakes at the elections are
very high and therefore the codiﬁcation of any electoral law should be done
with great care. The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters is a com-
prehensive guidebook published in 2002 by the European Commission for
Democracy through Law, better known as the Venice Commission that of-
fers help in this subject (Venice Commission, 2002a). The EU observers who
reviewed Albania's and Estonia's electoral law in 2011 consequently used this
source to evaluate the result (OSCE/ODIHR, 2011; Venice Commission and
OSCE/ODIHR, 2011). In 2012 Hungary also introduced some modiﬁcations
in its electoral law some of which closely followed the recommendations of
the Venice Commission. This paper focuses on one particular issue in this
Code, namely the fair apportionment of representatives: How to allocate con-
stituencies among political or administrative units, such as counties, regions
or states, so that the proportional representation of voters is least violated?
The apportionment problem generates constant debate even in countries
with well-established democracies such as the United States. (For a com-
prehensive historical overview see Balinski and Young, 1982). Democratic
countries are run by bodies of elected representatives. An equal inﬂuence on
their decisions require equally sized electoral districts, that is, constituencies
must have the same number of voters. This alone would not cause any dif-
ﬁculty, but in many cases the boundaries of the constituencies must respect
geographical, historical or administrative boundaries.
Equality in voting power, where the elections are not being
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held in one single constituency, requires constituency boundaries
to be drawn in such a way that seats in the lower chambers
representing the people are distributed equally among the con-
stituencies, in accordance with a speciﬁc apportionment criterion,
e.g. the number of residents in the constituency, the number
of resident nationals (including minors), the number of regis-
tered electors, or possibly the number of people actually voting
... Constituency boundaries may also be determined on the ba-
sis of geographical criteria and the administrative or indeed his-
toric boundary lines, which often depend on geography ... The
maximum admissible departure from the distribution criterion
adopted depends on the individual situation, although it should
seldom exceed 10% and never 15%, except in really exceptional
circumstances (a demographically weak administrative unit of
the same importance as others with at least one lower-chamber
representative, or concentration of a speciﬁc national minority).
When these requirements are not met the fairness of the whole elec-
tion is in jeopardy. In Georgia, where the electoral law of 1999 did not
set rules about the sizes of constituencies, the number of voters per con-
stituency ranged from some 3,600 voters in the Lent'ekhi district or 4,200 in
the Kazbegi districts to over 138,000 in Kutaisi City (Venice Commission,
2002b). In other words, voters from Lent'ekhi or the Kazbegi district had
30 times more inﬂuence than those from Kutaisi City.
In the United States, on the other hand, no deviations are permitted, at
least in theory. In Singapore the toleration limit is 30%, and further examples
are given in Handley (2007): Other common thresholds are 5 percent (e.g.,
New Zealand, Albania, and Yemen); 10 percent (e.g., Australia, Italy, and
the Ukraine); 15 percent (e.g., Armenia, Germany, and the Czech Republic)
and 20 percent (e.g., Zimbabwe and Papua New Guinea). In Canada, the
independent commissions charged with creating federal electoral districts are
allowed to deviate by up to 25 percent from the provincial quotas, and even
more under `extraordinary circumstances'. A recent proposal to reform
the constituency map of the United Kingdom worked with a 5% permitted
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deviation from the average size (Balinski, Johnston, McLean, Young, and
Cummine, 2010).
In the European Union the recommendation of the Venice Commission
is seen as the guideline in electoral matters. For instance, the draft version
of the 2012 electoral law of Hungary adopted this recommendation almost
word by word, but the 10-15% maximal diﬀerence between the population
of any two constituency turned out to be infeasible given the actual size of
the parliament and the populations of counties, if the constituencies cannot
extend over county borders (Biró, Kóczy, and Sziklai, 2012; Bodnár, 2012).
Even with the subsequent relaxation allowing a 15% (at most 20%) departure
from the average size of constituencies in the ﬁnal version the requirements
were just met.
2 The apportionment problem and its properties
An apportionment problem (p, H) is a pair consisting a vector
p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn)
of state populations, where P =
∑
i pi is the population of the country and
H denotes the number of seats in the legislature or House. Our task is to de-
termine the non-negative integers a1, a2, . . . , an with
∑
i ai = H representing
the number of constituencies in states 1, 2, . . . , n.
Let p ∈ Nn and a ∈ Nn0 be the n-dimensional vectors that contain the
population sizes and the allotted number of seats respectively. An appor-
tionment method or rule is a function M that assigns an allotment for each
instance of an apportionment problem. In general, apportionment methods
need not result in a unique allotment, i.e. M can be set-valued. Throughout
the paper we will employ the following notation: let x,y ∈ Rn, we say that
x ≥ y if xi ≥ yi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
In the following we introduce several properties of apportionments.
Quota A good apportionment rule is as close to proportionality as possible.
The apportionment ruleM(p, H) = a satisﬁes exact quota when the fractions
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ai =
pi
P H are integers for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Unfortunately it is hardly ever
the case that such an ideal situation occurs.
Since states cannot receive fractional districts, taking one of the nearest
integers to the exactly proportional share is a natural choice. The apportion-
ment rule M(p, H) = a satisﬁes lower (upper) quotas, if no state receives
less (more) constituencies than the lower (upper) integer part of its respec-
tive share, that is ai ≥
⌊pi
P H
⌋
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ai ≤
⌈pi
P H
⌉
for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, respectively.
An apportionment rule M satisﬁes the Hare quota property if it satisﬁes
both upper and lower quota.
Monotonicity The individual states should receive more seats when more
seats are available in the House. Formally:
Deﬁnition 1. An apportionment rule M is house-monotonic if M(p, H ′) ≥
M(p, H) for any apportionment problem (p, H) and House sizes H ′ > H.
A scenario where increasing the House size would decrease the number
of seats allotted to a state is often considered undesirable, perhaps even
paradoxical. An apportionment rule where this is possible is said to exhibit
the Alabama paradox referring to a historical occurrence of the phenomenon
in the case of state Alabama. A rule is said to be house-monotonic if it does
not suﬀer from such weakness.
There is a related monotonicity requirement and the associated paradox
when populations are considered. The population paradox arises when the
population of two states increases at diﬀerent rates. Then it is possible that
the state with more rapid growth actually loses seats to the state with slower
growth.
Deﬁnition 2. An apportionment ruleM is population-monotonic ifM(p′, H)i ≥
M(p, H)i for any House size H and population sizes p,p
′ such that p′i > pi,
p′j > pj and
p′i
pi
≥ p
′
j
pj
while p′k = pk for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, k 6= i, j.
Balinski and Young (1975) provided a so-called Quota-method that is
house-monotonic and fulﬁlls the Hare-quota property as well, but proved
that no method satisﬁes Hare-quota that is free from both Alabama and the
population paradoxes (Balinski and Young, 1982).
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Maximal diﬀerence property The next property characterizes the rec-
ommendation1 made by the Venice Commission (2002a). Let a¯ = PH denote
the average size of a constituency and let δi be the diﬀerence in percentage,
displayed by the constituencies of state i and let di be its absolute value.
Formally
δi =
pi
ai
− a¯
a¯
and di = |δi| (1)
For a given apportionment problem (p, H) let α(p,H) be the smallest
maximal diﬀerence that can be achieved with an allotment i.e.
α(p,H) = min
a
max
i∈{1,...,n}
{di} (2)
Deﬁnition 3. An apportionment rule M satisﬁes the maximal diﬀerence
property if
∣∣∣∣ piM(p,H)i−a¯a¯ ∣∣∣∣ ≤ α(p,H) for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The philosophy behind the Hare-quota and the maximal diﬀerence prop-
erty is very similar, but not quite the same. The Hare-quota speciﬁes how
many seats a state should receive at least and at most. If a state gets less
than its lower quota, then the allotment can be considered somewhat unfair
from the point of view of that particular state. The maximal diﬀerence prop-
erty is concerned rather with the individual voter. If the population sizes
of the constituencies diﬀer too much so does the voters' inﬂuence. Not sur-
prisingly, the Hare-quota property plays more central role in the U.S. where
the states are large and highly independent. In Europe, where the countries
consist of small and in some sense uniform counties, the maximal diﬀerence
property is more accepted2.
1Although the Venice Commission is ﬂexible on what kind of data should be the dis-
tribution criterion based on, it is clear that the diﬀerence from the average value is to be
minimized. The most common interpretation is that there should be a limit on the allow-
able departure on the average number of registered voters per constituency (see Handley
(2007)). We follow this practice as well, nevertheless our results hold in general, irrespec-
tive of the chosen reference data.
2Many European electoral laws impose a ﬁxed limit on maxi∈{1,...,n}{di} rather than
minimizing it. The Venice Commission follows this practice as well. It can happen,
however, that, given an apportionment problem, no allotment exists that satisfy a certain
limit, while an allotment with minimal diﬀerence always exists.
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3 The Maximal Diﬀerence Property
In this section we review the basic features of the maximal diﬀerence prop-
erty. In the following we will omit the lower index of α(p,H) and write simply
α. First let us note that α is not monotone in the House size. To see this
consider the allocation problem where p = (100, 200) and let H = 3. Then
it is possible to distribute the seats according to the exact quota thus α = 0.
Increasing H by 1 however will spoil both d1 and d2.
3.1 Upper bounds on the maximal diﬀerence
Obviously di is the smallest if state i receives either its lower or upper quota.
Let li and ui, respectively denote these quotas of state i respectively and let
βi denote the minimum diﬀerence achievable for state i. The maximum of
these βi values, denoted by β, is a natural lower bound for α. Formally:
βi = min
(∣∣∣∣ pili − a¯a¯
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ piui − a¯a¯
∣∣∣∣), β = maxi∈N βi.
Empirical analysis shows that, in general, increasing H results in a lower
α ceteris paribus. The problem with small House sizes is that they imply a
larger average constituency size. Divisibility issues can appear for smaller
states that are only a few times as large as a¯. It can happen that the average
size of the constituencies of state i is equally far away from a¯ for both the
lower and upper integer part of Ppi , formally
pi
li
− a¯
a¯
=
a¯− piui
a¯
. (3)
For instance, if li = 2 and ui = 3 then pi =
12
5 a¯ and di = 0.2. A simple
computation shows that, in general, if (3) holds, then di =
1
2li+1
. The next
table summarizes the problematic state population sizes.
In other words, if there is a state with population 43 of the average con-
stituency size then α is at least 13 . For this value a lower d cannot be adhered
to. One way to overcome this is to increase the house size H and thereby
increase the number of constituencies allocated to each state, in particular,
to the smallest state. For let i denote the smallest state and
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li − ui pi βi
1− 2 43 a¯ 0.333
2− 3 125 a¯ 0.2
3− 4 247 a¯ 0.143
4− 5 409 a¯ 0.111
5− 6 6011 a¯ 0.091
Table 1: Critical state population regarding divisibility
γ
def
=

1
2li+1
if li 6= 0,
∞ if li = 0.
As the House size increases, li increases, and therefore γ decrases. Note
that γ is an upper bound for β but there is no obvious connection between
γ and α. For instance, if we are able to distribute the seats according to the
exact quota, then α is zero, but γ can be high. However let p1, p2 = 200 and
p3 = 600 and let the House size equal to 7. Then γ =
1
3 , but α ≥ 0.4. We
will further analyze the relation of α, β and γ in Section 5 using real data.
3.2 Properties
As we mentioned earlier, the Hare-quota and maximal diﬀerence properties
have diﬀerent objectives. An apportionment method that implements the
latter will distribute less seats to a state than its lower quota if the max-
imal diﬀerence can be lowered in this way. Large states serve as puﬀers
where superﬂuous seats can be allocated or seats can be acquired if there are
needed elsewhere as these do not change the average size of constituencies
dramatically. Table 2 demonstrates this process.
In the above example the total population equals to 201 while the average
constituency size is 10.05. If we insist on applying the Hare-quota then State
E must receive at least 9 seats. As a result State A - the smallest one - gets
only 2. The voters in State B have the greatest inﬂuence, more than 44%
more than the voters in State A. On the other hand if we apply the maximal
diﬀerence property the largest bias - 31% - can be observed between State
A and E.
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Method ⇒ Maximal diﬀerence Hare-quota
State Population seats piai δi seats
pi
ai
δi
A 26 3 8.666 −0.138 2 13 0.293
B 27 3 9 −0.104 3 9 −0.104
C 28 3 9.333 −0.071 3 9.333 −0.071
D 29 3 9.666 −0.038 3 9.666 −0.038
E 91 8 11.375 0.131 9 10.111 0.006
Table 2: Hare-quota vs. maximal diﬀerence
Finally we note that the maximal diﬀerence property is not compatible
with house-monotonicity either. An apportionment rule that minimizes the
maximal diﬀerence can produce the Alabama-paradox.
State Population Seats piai di Seats
pi
ai
di
A 69 3 23 0.114 4 17.250 −0.104
B 70 3 23.333 0.130 4 17.500 −0.091
C 150 8 18.750 −0.091 7 21.428 0.112
Total 289 14 20.642 15 19.266
Table 3: House-monotonicity and maximal diﬀerence
Table 3 shows an example where increasing the House size from 14 to
15 causes State C to lose a seat. State C is the largest state hence its
average constituency size changes only a little when one of its seats is assigned
elsewhere. A House-monotone allotment such as a = (3, 4, 8) would have
a 0.193 as maximal diﬀerence almost twice as much as the allotment in
the example. This also exceeds the 15% limit of the Venice Commission's
recommendation, making it an unfeasible solution.
In summary we can say that neither the Hare-quota nor House-monotoni-
city is compatible with the maximal diﬀerence property. Therefore there is
no apportionment rule that is conform with the recommendation made by
the Venice Commission and is free from the Alabama paradox or produces
allotments according to the Hare-quota. We consider this a conﬂict between
equality among states versus equality among voters. The Venice commission
clearly cast its vote in favour of the second.
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4 The lexicographically optimal solution
The recommendation of the Venice Commission gives a strong constraint for
the solution of an apportionment problem. However, the set of allowable
allotments can still be large, that may leave room for gerrymandering by
the decision makers. As Balinski and Young (1975) also argue, having a
well-deﬁned allotment rule that leads to a unique solution is the best way to
avoid political issues in the apportionment process.
In this section we deﬁne a new apportionment method where the diﬀer-
ences from the average size of constituencies are lexicographically minimized.
This uniquely deﬁned rule satisﬁes the maximal diﬀerence property, so it is
based on the Venice Commission's recommendation. We also give an eﬃcient
algorithm to compute such a solution.
Given an apportionment problem (p, H) and an allotment a, let d(a)
denote a nonnegative n-dimensional vector, where the diﬀerences di(a) are
contained in a nondecreasing order. A solution a is said to be lexicographi-
cally minimal, or simply leximin, if there is no other allotment a′ where d(a′)
is lexicographically smaller than d(a), denoted by d(a′) ≺ d(a).
Greedy leximin algorithm
Let us refer to a ∈ Nn as a pre-allotment if the ∑i ai = H condition is
relaxed. Let ai+ denote a pre-allotment adjusted from a, where ai+i = ai + 1
and ai+j = aj for each j 6= i. Similarly, let ai− denote a pre-allotment, where
ai−i = ai − 1 and ai−j = aj for each j 6= i. For simplicity, and to ensure the
uniqueness of the solution, we assume that di(a) is not equal to dj(a) for
any strictly positive pre-allotment a and pair of counties i and j. (Note that
this condition can be always satisﬁed if we perturb p, and it does not eﬀect
the optimality of the solution.)
Phase 1: Let a[0] be a pre-allotment such that di(a[0]) is minimal for each state
i (i.e. equal to βi). Let the total number of seats allocated in a[0] be
l =
∑n
i=1 ai[0]. If l = H then STOP, a[0] is the leximin allotment.
Phase 2: If l < H then for each t = 0, 1 . . . H− l−1 do the following adjustment.
Let a[t+ 1] = ai+[t] for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that di(ai+[t]) is minimal.
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If l > H then for each t = 0, 1 . . . H− l−1 do the following adjustment.
Let a[t+ 1] = ai−[t] for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that di(ai−[t]) is minimal.
That is, we ﬁrst ﬁnd a pre-allotment a[0] that is lexicographically minimal
and then we simply increase (or decrease) the number of seats in a greedy
way, we add (or remove) a seat to (or from) state i if the increased diﬀerence
is the smallest for this state. In what follows we show that these greedy
adjustments lead to leximin pre-allotments in each step, and therefore a
leximin allotment at the end of the process.
Theorem 4. The greedy leximin algorithm results in the leximin solution
for the apportionment problem.
Proof. If
∑n
i=1 ai[0] = l = H then a[0] is the leximin allotment, obviously.
We note that the Hare-quota property holds for pre-allotment a[0], so the
diﬀerence |l −H| must be less than or equal to n.
Suppose that l < H (the case of l > H can be proved in a similar way).
Let us show by induction for t = 0, 1, . . . ,H − l, that a[t] is the leximin
allotment if l+ t seats are available, so in particular, a[H − l] is the leximin
allotment for the original problem. The statement is true for t = 0, suppose
that it is true for an arbitrary t : 0 < t < H−l and let us verify the statement
for t+ 1.
Suppose for a contradiction that there exist an allotment b where the
total number of seats allocated is l+ t and d(b) is lexicographically smaller
than d(a[l + t+ 1]).
It is straightforward to see that a[0] ≤ a ≤ a′ and a 6= a′ implies d(a) ≺
d(a′).
First we prove that d(a[t]) ≺ d(b). Let i be a state where bi > ai[t].
Then a[0] ≤ bi− ≤ b implies d(bi−) ≺ d(b). Therefore d(b) ≺ d(a[t])
would imply d(bi−) ≺ d(a[t]), contradicting with our assumption since bi−
is an allotment with l + t seats.
Let us now assume that when adjusting the pre-allotment a[t] to a[t+1] in
the greedy algorithm we increased the number of seats in country i. Suppose
that the diﬀerence di(a[t]) is the rth largest, i.e. di(a[t]) is the rth entry of
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vector d(a[t+1]). The ﬁrst r−1 entries of d(a) and d(a[t+1]) are the same,
so d(a[t]) ≺ d(b) ≺ d(a[t+1]) implies that the ﬁrst r−1 entries of b are also
the same, so in the corresponding r − 1 counties these three pre-allotments
assign the same number of seats. From bi ≤ ai[t + 1] it follows that among
the rest of the n− r counties there must be one, say j, where bj > aj [t+ 1]
since both b and a[t+ 1] allocate l+ t+ 1 seats, and they are not identical.
But d(b) ≺ d(a[t+ 1]) implies dj(b) < di(a[t+ 1]), which contradicts with
the selection of i in the greedy algorithm.
Note that both Phase 1 and Phase 2 can be conducted in n2 steps, if one
step means a comparison of two diﬀerences.
5 Data Analysis
In this section we ﬁrst evaluate the 2011 Electoral Law of Hungary that
triggered our interest in the recommendations of the Venice Commission at
the ﬁrst place. Then we look at the United States Senate and discuss the
allocation of seats according to the leximin method.
5.1 Hungary
The 2011 Electoral Law of Hungary drastically decreased the number of
seats in the parliament and ﬁxed the number of constituencies to 106. The
law also proposed a seat distribution among the counties. Although the
apportionment method was not provided, the law prescribed some principles
for subsequent redistribution of seats. These conditions closely followed the
directives of the Venice Comission. The law requires that the diﬀerence
between the population of any constituency and the average constituency
size should be within 15%. The only exception is if a constituency would
extend over the county border or its connectivity could not be ensured. In
this cases higher diﬀerence is allowed, but if it ever exceeds 20% then a
new allotment should be provided. Table 4 compares the seat distribution
proposed by the law with the one that is produced by the leximin algorithm3.
3To calculate δi we used the demographic data of the 2010 election.
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County Voters
Seats Diﬀerence (%)
law leximin law leximin
Budapest 1 407 470 18 17 1 6.95
Baranya 325 943 4 4 5.26 5.26
Bács-Kiskun 438 352 6 6 −5.63 −5.63
Békés 308 471 4 4 −0.38 −0.38
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 567 910 7 7 4.8 4.8
Csongrád 345 945 4 5 11.72 −10.63
Fejér 351 237 5 5 −9.26 −9.26
Gyõr-Moson-Sopron 364 894 5 5 −5.73 −5.73
Hajdú-Bihar 439 618 6 6 −5.35 −5.35
Heves 257 490 3 3 10.87 10.87
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 324 869 4 4 4.91 4.91
Komárom-Esztergom 255 396 3 3 9.97 9.97
Nógrád 170 463 2 2 10.1 10.10
Pest 973 668 12 12 4.81 4.81
Somogy 268 844 4 4 −13.18 −13.18
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 450 556 6 6 −3 −3
Tolna 196 751 3 3 −15.28 −15.28
Vas 215 773 3 3 −7.09 −7.09
Veszprém 300 081 4 4 −3.09 −3.09
Zala 242 236 3 3 4.3 4.3
Total 8 205 967 106 106
Table 4: The seat distribution and the diﬀerences from the average district
size by the Electoral Law and by the leximin algorithm
Note that only two out of 20 counties have a diﬀerent number of seats
allotted. The average constituency size in Heves County is 853830 which
is 30.87% higher than the average constituency size of Tolna. Therefore
voters in Tolna have 30.87% more inﬂuence than those living in Heves. If we
allow 20% discrepancy from the average constituency size then the diﬀerence
between voters' inﬂuence can be as high as 50%. Interestingly, it is not these
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counties where the apportionment by law diﬀers from the results of the 7
common methods calculated by Bodnár (2012), but Pest and Somogy.
Upper bounds on the maximal diﬀerence
The following ﬁgure shows how the maximal diﬀerence from the average
constituency size (α) changes as we increase the House size from 50 to 180.
Figure 1: The decline of maximal diﬀerence compared to increasing House
size using voter data from 2006 and 2010.
Increasing House size indeed implies smaller maximal diﬀerence, although
α is far from being monotone. The upper bounds imposed by γ are clearly
visible. The graph never crosses 33.33%, and for higher H values the upper
limits are 20% and 14.28%. This implies that α coincides with β in most of
the cases. A deeper analysis shows that α = β is true for a broader range of
H. From the [50, 400] interval there are only two exceptions, namely, when
the House size equals to 87 and 88. But even for these values it is true
that α < γ. Our conjecture is that for real life data α rarely diﬀers from β,
therefore γ can be an eﬀective upper bound for both. That means that if
one would like to meet the Venice Commission's recommendation, then the
House size should be set so high that the lower quota of the smallest county
is at least 3 for the strict 15% limit.
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Due to the demographic changes the local minimum of α shifted from
106 to 108 in four years. It can easily happen that in the near future 106
seats would mean the local maximum for α. A solution for this issue would
be to choose the House size from an interval rather than ﬁxing it. Although
this seems to lead to an unpredictable system, in reality it would imply only
a minor change from one election to the next as there would be one or two
counties that would receive extra seats or have to give up one.
Monotonicity
Figure 2 shows how frequently the Alabama-paradox occurs as the House
size changes.
Figure 2: The number of constituencies in Budapest and in Pest county in
view of House size
The anomaly occurs only in the two largest counties4. As we mentioned
earlier, the explanation is simple: large counties behave as puﬀers. They can
store constituencies without aﬀecting the leximin ordering too much and
`borrow' seats for smaller counties that are crucial for the leximin ordering.
4For higher House sizes the paradox occurs in the next largest county, Borsod-Abaúj-
Zemplén as well.
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Changing the size of the regions
Finally, another way to lower the maximal diﬀerence is to increase the size of
the administrative units that bundles the constituencies. Instead of counties
we can use regions requiring only that no constituency extends over the
region border. Table 5 summarizes the results for regions.
Region Voters
Number of seats Diﬀerence. (%)
law leximin law leximin
Northern Hungary 995 863 12 13 10.87 1.05
Northern Great Plain 1 215 043 16 16 5.35 1.90
Southern Great Plain 1 092 768 14 14 11.72 0.83
Central Hungary 2 381 138 30 30 4.81 2.53
Central Transdanubia 906 714 12 12 9.97 2.40
Western Transdanubia 822 903 11 11 7.09 3.37
Southern Transdanubia 791 538 11 10 15.28 2.25
Total 8 205 967 106 106
Table 5: The optimal seat distribution where no constituency extends over
the region border
For instance, Northern Hungary consists of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Heves
and Nógrád counties. By the law 7, 3 and 2 seats are assigned to them re-
spectively, altogether 12. Heves produces the highest diﬀerence from the
average: 10.87%. However if we treat these three counties as one adminis-
trative unit then it receives 13 seats and the sizes of its constituencies will
be 76605, only 1.05% lower than the average. In this way Western Trans-
danubia generates the highest average 3.37% which is only a fraction of the
15.28% that Tolna county produces.
5.2 The United States Congress
Much of the literature of apportionment is based on the problems encoun-
tered at the regular updates of seat allocation in the United States Congress.
In the following we explain how and why our recommended allocation for
the US Congress diﬀers and how the current method fares in general when
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compared with our leximin approach.
5.2.1 The leximin vs. the equal proportions method
To further illustrate the properties of the leximin rule let us compare it with
the equal proportion (EP) method, that is used to distribute the seats of the
US Congress. The EP is a house-monotone apportionment rule, but it does
not satisfy Hare-quota (although it rarely produces a non-quota solution).
The table of the apportionment of the 2010 US census compared with the
result of the leximin algorithm can be found in the appendix A; Figure 3
provides a visual summary.
Figure 3: The number of citizens per representative according to the leximin
method (in thousands). In parentheses the same ﬁgure for the EP method
(where diﬀerent). Note the dramatic swing for Montana.
The two resulting allotments are very similar. In fact there are only two
states where the solutions diﬀer: California and Montana. The scenario is the
same we have seen before. The largest state lends a seat to one of the smaller
ones and the maximal diﬀerence drops by almost 10%. It is quite surprising
that the voters of Rhode Island - where the average constituency size is the
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smallest - have 88% more inﬂuence than the voters of Montana. Although
the leximin allotment reduces this gap somewhat, the only eﬃcient solution
would be to drastically increase the House size. As there are 50 states and
seven among them end up with only one representative each, the size of the
Congress can be considered rather small. Figure 4 shows how the maximal
diﬀerence changes for higher House sizes.
Figure 4: The maximal diﬀerence in view of the House size
Maximal diﬀerences
As it can be anticipated the maximal diﬀerence of the leximin solution never
exceeds 33.3% however for the EP there is no such limit. To make cer-
tain that the maximal diﬀerence is below 20% we have to ensure that the
smallest state, Wyoming a) receives at least two representatives and b) the
constituency size obtained this way is within 20% of the average. A simple
calculation shows that the smallest House size that guarantees these two cri-
teria is 871 - a little more than twice its current size. As it is unlikely that
the Congress will be expanded in such fashion the inﬂuence of the voters
will continue to vary from state to state. A temporary solution would be to
increase the number of representatives by seven. The maximal diﬀerence for
both the leximin and the EP solution meets its minimum at House size 442.
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In that case the highest gap between voters inﬂuence is `only' 55.19%.
6 Conclusion
More and more countries adopt fairness measures in their electoral law that
is based on, or similar to the recommendation of the Venice Commission
(2002a). The Maximal Diﬀerence Property is very natural and provides
greater equality among citizens than other apportionment principles. Unfor-
tunately, the property turns out to be incompatible with the Hare-quota, the
population- and house-monotonicities over the class of apportionment prob-
lems, so that the Alabama and population paradoxes may arise when using
it. Based on the Maximal Diﬀerence Property we introduce the well-deﬁned
Leximin Rule.
Our apportionment method is not the ﬁrst. The problem of apportion-
ment goes centuries back, the problem has been around ever since the new
member states and population changes required a new seat allocation in the
US Congress. Balinski and Young (1982) give an illuminating theoretical
and historical overview of the problem of apportionment and the political de-
bates that arose due to it. Methods like Hamilton's (also called the Method
of Largest Remainders), Jeﬀerson's (Method of Greatest Divisors, but in
Europe often referenced as the d'Hondt method), or the Huntingdon-Hill
or Equal Proportions method, the currently used method in the US House
of Representatives have all been developed as responses to practical prob-
lems with apportionment such as the emergence of one or another paradox.
Lauwers and Van Puyenbroeck (2006) compare some of these methods.
Apportionment problems are most often used for allocating seats among
administrative or political regions based on the population size of these re-
gions: states in the US congress, countries in the EU parliament and so
on. Our paper focuses on these applications. Apportionment is also used
for the allotment of seats to parties based on the outcome of an election, in
fact, sometimes both segmentations appear at the same time; the so-called
bi-apportionment is used in some European countries and the problem has
been studied by Demange (2012) and Seraﬁni and Simeone (2012).
The Lexicographic Rule is, to the best of our knowledge, an original
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apportionment method, although lexicographic solution concepts have al-
ready been proposed by Gambarelli (1999) and Gambarelli and Palestini
(2007). The closest model is by Seraﬁni and Simeone (2012), where the
relative diﬀerences from the target quotas are lexicographically minimized
in the bi-apportionment problem. However, their target quotas are not the
same as ours (when restricted to a one-dimensional case), and their methods
proposed are more complex, since they are designed for the more general
bi-apportionment problem.
There are also papers on minimizing the relative diﬀerence over pairs of
constituencies. Burt and Harris (1963) proposed this concept in for the US
House of Representatives, but then it got criticized by Gilbert and Schatz
(1964). A recent overview on this concept is given by Edelman (2006). Our
problem is diﬀerent from this one, and it is easy to construct an example
where the solutions minimizing the relative diﬀerence of any two constituen-
cies and the maximum departure from the average size diﬀer. So far, it
seems, none of these models are compatible with the recommendation of the
Venice Commission.
A The seat distribution of the US State Congress
by the equal proportion method and by the lex-
imin algorithm
State Voters
Number of seats Diﬀerence (%)
EP leximin EP leximin
Alabama 4 802 982 7 7 3.46 3.46
Alaska 721 523 1 1 1.51 1.51
Arizona 6 412 700 9 9 0.24 0.24
Arkansas 2 926 229 4 4 2.92 2.92
California 37 341 989 53 52 0.87 1.03
Colorado 5 044 930 7 7 1.39 1.39
Connecticut 3 581 628 5 5 0.78 0.78
Delaware 900 877 1 1 26.74 26.74
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Florida 18 900 773 27 27 1.51 1.51
Georgia 9 727 566 14 14 2.24 2.24
Hawaii 1 366 862 2 2 3.84 3.84
Idaho 1 573 499 2 2 10.69 10.69
Illinois 12 864 380 18 18 0.55 0.55
Indiana 6 501 582 9 9 1.63 1.63
Iowa 3 053 787 4 4 7.41 7.41
Kansas 2 863 813 4 4 0.72 0.72
Kentucky 4 350 606 6 6 2.01 2.01
Louisiana 4 553 962 6 6 6.78 6.78
Maine 1 333 074 2 2 6.22 6.22
Maryland 5 789 929 8 8 1.82 1.82
Massachusetts 6 559 644 9 9 2.54 2.54
Michigan 9 911 626 14 14 0.39 0.39
Minnesota 5 314 879 8 8 6.52 6.52
Mississippi 2 978 240 4 4 4.75 4.75
Missouri 6 011 478 8 8 5.72 5.72
Montana 994 416 1 2 39.90 30.04
Nebraska 1 831 825 3 3 14.09 14.09
Nevada 2 709 432 4 4 4.70 4.70
New Hampshire 1 321 445 2 2 7.04 7.04
New Jersey 8 807 501 12 12 3.26 3.26
New Mexico 2 067 273 3 3 3.04 3.04
New York 19 421 055 27 27 1.20 1.20
North Carolina 9 565 781 13 13 3.52 3.52
North Dakota 675 905 1 1 4.90 4.90
Ohio 11 568 495 16 16 1.72 1.72
Oklahoma 3 764 882 5 5 5.93 5.93
Oregon 3 848 606 5 5 8.29 8.29
Pennsylvania 12 734 905 18 18 0.46 0.46
Rhode Island 1 055 247 2 2 25.76 25.76
South Carolina 4 645 975 7 7 6.62 6.62
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South Dakota 819 761 1 1 15.33 15.33
Tennessee 6 375 431 9 9 0.33 0.33
Texas 25 268 418 36 36 1.24 1.24
Utah 2 770 765 4 4 2.54 2.54
Vermont 630 337 1 1 11.31 11.31
Virginia 8 037 736 11 11 2.80 2.80
Washington 6 753 369 10 10 4.98 4.98
West Virginia 1 859 815 3 3 12.77 12.77
Wisconsin 5 698 230 8 8 0.21 0.21
Wyoming 568 300 1 1 20.04 20.04
Total 309 183 463 435 435 max: 39.9 max: 30.04
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